First, thanks for this thread. I'm grateful for the stimulus to think more about this current history and the opportunities to help out, what with the gofundme and other organizations (e.g., Americares here in Conn.).
Thoughtful analysis, imo, on diplomatic failures below.
My basic takeaway from this, and other analyses, is that I haven't found anything that suggests Russia under Putin has tried building positive relationships and security guarantees that offer counterparties (Ukraine) mutually beneficial outcomes. Because of that, I'm not very sympathetic to arguments that Putin was goaded or had no choice.
Oil and gas sales to the West are simply not of the right caliber, hey, it's just business, less charitably it's leverage.
The big question is (given what we think we know) what may be a reasonable diplomatic offramp? Sometimes there are no great choices, but I have blind hope.
IS RUSSIA’S INVASION A CASE OF COERCIVE DIPLOMACY GONE WRONG?
Article sketch, slightly out of order:
#1:
Where Ukraine and NATO saw themselves as attempting to deter aggression and resist blackmail, Russia saw itself as pursuing coercive diplomacy* to compel Ukraine and NATO to reverse course.
*As the article points out, a polite term for blackmail.
#2:
Indeed, for coercion to be successful, threats must be made to seem credible, practical demands must be made clear, and political resolve around those demands must be effectively conveyed.
#3:
On Dec. 15, Russia presented the United States and NATO with a list of diplomatic demands, several of which seemed wildly unrealistic. Russia effectively demanded that the United States permanently withdraw its nuclear forces from Europe and that NATO refrain from placing forces anywhere in the former Soviet Union.
and later
Russia claimed it intended to fully “demilitarize” Ukraine, and to rewrite its constitution to enshrine its formal neutrality as a matter of policy. These constitute ambitious demands indeed, especially when coupled with an insistence that Ukraine’s armed forces essentially surrender, and that Ukraine recognize Russian sovereignty in Crimea and the independence of the separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk
#4:
NATO and Ukraine may have assumed that Russia merely wanted to deter Ukraine from joining NATO, and thus viewed their deepening partnership as fair game. This was clearly a miscalculation about Russia’s intention to compel NATO and Ukraine to terminate and reverse what it perceived as a deleterious policy.
Which doesn't sound like "goading" a Russian invasion or "giving Putin no choice." So let me be clear: I see the bad guy as the barechested dude on the horse.
To pre-empt, the author is from the Stimson Institute, couldn't find anything that hints at being "Putin's plaything" nor an instrument of the "War Pigs."
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